More thoughts on the world as external memory
I’ve been reading through J. Kevin O’Regan’s book Why red doesn’t sound like a bell: Understanding the feel of consciousness. In the fall semester of this past year, I took a cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of mind class in the same semester and it was a really neat opportunity to see how thinking using vastly different methods on essentially the same topic can be insightful in different ways. In a sense, the philosophy of mind course was about consciousness—after all, who cares about the mind if you ignore consciousness—but still, I got the sense that in both philosophy and neuroscience, consciousness is such an intractable issue that we’re so ill-equipped to thinking about that facing it head-on tends to be only marginally fruitful. Nonetheless, those two classes left me in the search for theories of consciousness—the grand-unified theories of the mind that promise to finally explain our very experience as conscious things. I’ve read quite a bit about consciousness. As I’ve gon...